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I. INTRODUCTION 
Google is no stranger to antitrust law. Scott Cleland has 
estimated that the company “officially violated antitrust laws in 10 
different ways over 5 years.”1 Commentators routinely critique its 
practices as anti-competitive.2 It is under investigation in 9 
countries, the EU, and some states in the US.3 But in early January 
                                                                                                                  
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law 
1. See Scott Cleland, Google’s Global Antitrust Rap Sheet (Jan. 2012), 
http://googleopoly.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Googles-Global-Antitrust-Rap-
Sheet1.pdf; see also Antitrust Regulators Raid Google’s Offices in South Korea, BBC (Sep. 
7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14816295. 
2. Joshua Hazan, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 789, (2013) (arguing that “Google’s conduct does in fact violate § 2 of the Sherman 
Act and § 5 of the FTC Act”); Nathan Newman, The Cost of Lost Privacy: Search, Antitrust, 
and the Economics of Control of User Data 1 (on file with authors) (“what is largely missed 
in analyses defending Google from antitrust action is how that ever expanding control of 
user personal data and its critical value to online advertisers creates an insurmountable 
barrier to entry for new competition”); Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Results?: 
Diagnosis and Response, 7 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 16, 30 (2011) (India). 
3. See Cleland, supra note 1; see also Antitrust Commission Probes Allegations of 
Antitrust Violations by Google EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 30 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm; Google Faces Texas AG Inquiry, 
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2013, Google scored a major victory, as the FTC agreed to drop 
nearly all of the most publicized part of its case against the 
company: allegations of biased and anticompetitive behavior in 
search results. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch worried that 
Google may have been “telling ‘half-truths’ — for example, that 
its gathering of information about the characteristics of a consumer 
is done solely for the consumer’s benefit, instead of also to 
maintain a monopoly or near-monopoly position.”4 But the 
majority of the Commission decided unequivocally to end the 
investigation.  They publicly justified the decision with  little more 
than a page of assurances that FTC interviews and economic 
analyses had found little to no problematic behavior.5  
Antitrust complaints against Google crescendoed just as the 
company’s market capitalization surpassed that of Microsoft, 
another web giant. In the late 1990s, competition authorities in the 
US and EU intervened to prevent Microsoft from using its power 
over operating systems to funnel PC buyers into the company’s 
Internet Explorer web browser, Media Player for music, and Office 
for productivity software. The EU, for example, forced a “browser 
ballot” onto personal computers using Microsoft’s operating 
system.6 Restrictions on Microsoft’s ability to tie browsers, media 
players, and other software to its dominant operating system 
allowed companies like Google to survive and thrive on the 
Internet.  
                                                                                                                  
Settles Privacy Suit, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/us-google-settlement-
idUSN0312083220100903; Italy Launches Antitrust Probe Of Google News, LAW 360 
(Aug. 27, 2009) http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/118735/italy-launches-antitrust-
probe-of-google-news. 
4. Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding 
Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, note 1 
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchroschstmt.pdf. 
5. FTC Closing Letter, STATEMENT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N REGARDING GOOGLE’S 
SEARCH PRACTICES IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE INC., FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf. The Commission’s 
statement says, “The totality of the evidence indicates that, in the main, Google adopted 
[changes] improve the quality of its search results, and that any negative impact on actual or 
potential competitors was incidental to that purpose.” But the Commission has not released 
details about the nature of that evidence, the types of tests it used, or the standards employed 
in them.  
6. See generally Andrew Chin, Scholarship: Antitrust Principles in Information 
Technology, available at http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/ 
index.htm#antitrustinit.  When Microsoft failed to add the browser ballot screen to all 
versions of windows, the EU fined it €561 million for noncompliance.  Jon Brodkin, EU 
Fines Microsoft €561 million for not giving users a browser choice, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 6, 
2013, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/eu-fines-microsoft-e561-million-for-
not-giving-users-a-browser-choice/.   
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Now competition authorities beyond the FTC are considering 
whether Google itself is a monopolizer, cutting off upstart, 
specialized search engines in order to expand its own internet 
empire. Their decisions will shape the future of the digital 
marketplace. Without strong action, centrifugal tendencies will 
increasingly dominate the internet, as innovation will centralize in 
the few mega-firms capable of promoting new services on an ever-
less-level playing field. If antitrust law continues to decline in 
power and scope, we should expect a digital replay of the 
domination of monopolistic trusts in the late 19th century. As 
central to our era’s economy as railroads were to that time’s 
economy, these mega-firms are likely to exploit their 
infrastructural status for as long as they can convince regulators 
and politicians that their market domination is the natural price of 
innovation.  Thus other competition authorities need to avoid the 
FTC’s quiescence. This essay explains (a) what the search bias 
case was about, (b) why competition is not “one click away,” (c) 
why the FTC’s explanation of its inaction was unsatisfactory, and 
(d) how competition agencies will need to treat search bias claims 
going forward to avoid the embarrassing denouement of the FTC’s 
investigation.  
II. A BRIEF GUIDE TO SEARCH BIAS CONCERNS 
Imagine that you own Company A, and your main competitor 
is the persistent (but demonstrably worse) Company B. In searches 
for the products you sell, you reliably end up in the top five results 
in the studies you’ve commissioned; your competitors at Company 
B are on the fifth or sixth pages. What happens if Google 
purchases Company B, and immediately after the purchase, 
Company B appears to dominate the first page of results, and your 
company has been relegated to later pages? You might start by 
appealing to Google employees who run webmaster forums there, 
but that (and other mechanisms of corporate due process) are quite 
likely to fail. Should there be some type of remedy at law? 
As Google acquires more companies, this type of dispute is 
becoming increasingly likely. Agencies and courts around the 
world have already heard many complaints about anticompetitive 
practices at Google. But there are many economists and lawyers 
who would dismiss such complaints as parochial disputes, whines 
from also-rans unaccustomed to the harsh new realities of online 
competition. The etiolated state of American antitrust law makes 
that position popular among US elites. 
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Despite growing concern about online intermediaries’ power, 
legal authorities have done little to regulate these intermediaries 
over the past decade. If a search engine is abusing its position, 
market-oriented scholars say, economic forces will usually solve 
the problem.7 Can’t find something on Google? Hop over to the 
Bing search engine. Don’t like the new version of iTunes? Buy a 
subscription to a music service.  
However well it worked in prior decades, this sanguine attitude 
runs into several problems in the digital age.8 How are users to 
even know if something is being hidden from them if they are 
coming to a firm like Apple or Google to find what they need? As 
antitrust authorities investigated it in 2012, Google’s 
spokespersons never tired of repeating that “competition is just a 
click away;” users had only to type in “Bing” to find another 
search engine. The mantra was disingenuous, since it was the 
entities that were trying to be found, and not consumers acting as 
“finders,” who had initiated the complaints against Google. Small, 
web-based companies had to go where the users were—and in 
general purpose search, that was largely Google (just as Twitter 
dominates microblogging, Facebook general social networking, 
and Apple a leading entertainment and app ecosystem).  
Nevertheless, scholars have tended to assume that the more 
innovation happens on the Internet, the more choices users will 
have and the more efficient the market will become. Yet these 
scholars have not paid enough attention to the kind of innovation 
that is best for society, and whether the uncoordinated preferences 
of millions of web users for low-cost convenience are likely to 
address the many concerns raised by dominant intermediaries.9 
                                                                                                                  
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright, Google and the Limits Of Antitrust: The 
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV.  J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 181 (Winter, 
2011) (arguing that these investigations are not based on good antitrust policy).  For a 
parallel argument in the communications field, see Douglas A. Hass, The Never-Was-
Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Network Neutrality Debates, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1569, 1620–28 (2007) (Describing “the inherent enforcement 
difficulties in preemptive or ex post neutrality regulation,” and doubting the utility of 
antitrust law).  I have tried to demonstrate that both the communications and search 
industries need such rules, given their pivotal role in the economy.  Frank Pasquale, Internet 
Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 
U. CHI. LEG. F. 263, 265 (2008). 
8. See BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010). 
9. A notable exception is Maurice Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 951 (2008) (Noting that “[p]revailing competition advocacy glosses over four 
fundamental questions: First, what is competition? Second, what are the goals of a 
competition policy? Third, how does one achieve, if one can, the objectives of such desired 
competition? Fourth, how does one know if the economy is progressing toward these 
goals?”).  
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This has left policymakers adrift, and quick to resort to canned 
stories about competition and consumer welfare that miss the 
stakes of a case like Google’s.   
III. REASONS TO DOUBT THAT “COMPETITION IS ONLY A 
CLICK AWAY” 
Despite persistent controversies surrounding Google, and its 
longstanding dominance in the search industry, leading 
policymakers have tended to assume that competition will 
eventually assuage most critics’ concerns. If consumers wanted a 
more open search engine, so the story goes, they would demand it. 
When I testified before a Congressional committee in 2008 about 
Google's market power, virtually every representative who 
questioned me assumed that a clique of twentysomethings working 
in a garage could develop an alternative. The representatives didn’t 
know much about the Internet, but the press had taught them about 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s rise from grad students to 
billionaires, building a corporate behemoth out of old servers and 
ingenuity. In the popular imagination, the Silicon Valley giants’ 
own rags-to-riches story forever foreshadows their own eventual 
displacement by another upstart.10 
Is competition actually likely? In his book Planet Google, 
Randall Stross suggested that the company was using up to a 
million computers to index and map the web.11 If he’s even within 
an order of magnitude of the real number (a strictly protected trade 
secret), that ought to give pause to anyone who thinks an 
alternative can be cooked up in a garage. Indeed, a cursory review 
of the growing literature on the power usage of Google belies the 
“garage innovator” fantasy: its data centers use the equivalent of 
Salt Lake City’s voltage.12 (If your garage can hold about 190,000 
people, maybe you can swing that; if it holds 2 cars, you might 
need a few more outlets). Companies may be able to lease 
computing space at Amazon or other suppliers, but it’s almost 
                                                                                                                  
10. See, e.g., John Naughton, Why the Facebook and Apple Empires are Bound to Fail, 
THE Guardian (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology 
/2013/jan/27/facebook-apple-only-way-is-down?CMP=twt_gu. Similar arguments have 
been made about Google for years.  Such authors rarely if ever acknowledge how long 
dominance would need to last for them to consider it to be a problem, and the answer is 
likely the same as Jack Valenti’s view of the optimal copyright term: forever minus one day. 
11. RANDALL STROSS, PLANET GOOGLE: ONE COMPANY’S AUDACIOUS PLAN TO 
ORGANIZE EVERYTHING WE KNOW (2007). 
12. See James Glanz, Google Details, and Defends, Its Use of Electricity, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/technology/google-details-and-
defends-its-use-of-electricity.html. 
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impossible to imagine a ragtag crew of grad students, even with a 
few million or tens of millions of dollars in venture capital 
funding, taking on a large firm like Google. Google is far, far more 
likely to purchase a start-up with valuable search technology 
(something it tends to do twice a month) than it is to be displaced 
by one.13 
True, a few other giants might take Google on. Microsoft has 
poured money into Bing, but has so far lost billions of dollars—an 
unsustainable investment. Governments tried to create an 
alternative for a while, but the European Quaero project sputtered 
out. Perhaps the engineers involved concluded that the $450 
million or so allocated to it could not support a viable rival to a 
company with $100 billion in annual revenue. Finally, even if 
fellow Goliaths like Facebook, Apple, and Twitter manage to 
squeeze Google out of the burgeoning worlds of social media, 
mobile computing, and microblogging, they will raise the same 
concerns to the extent their domination in those areas matches 
Google’s in general purpose search. 
Beyond the infrastructural challenge, many other factors make 
it extremely difficult for competitors to emerge in the general-
purpose search space. Google’s secrecy is not only designed to 
keep spammers from manipulating its results; it can also prevent 
rival companies from copying its methods or building upon them. 
Unlike patents, which the patent holder must disclose and which 
eventually expire, it is possible for trade secrets to never be 
revealed, let alone enter the public domain.14 
Innovation in search is heavily dependent on a base of users 
that “train” algorithms to be more responsive.15 The more search 
queries a search engine gets, the better able it is to sharpen and 
perfect its results.16 For example, if a search engine finds that 
everyone in a given area clicks on the third result instead of the 
                                                                                                                  
13. See Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for 
Carriers and Search Engines, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2008 (Describing 
Google’s acquisition strategy).  
14. Sequential innovation in the private sector relies on later “improvers” being able to 
stand on the shoulders of earlier innovators. Trade secrecy threatens to nip that process in 
the bud, siloing innovation in search into the firm that came to dominance first.  
15. See James Pitkow et. al., Personalized Search, 45 COMMS. ACM, Vol. 45:9 (Sept. 
2002) at 51 (discussing methods of personalizing search systems); Elinor Mills, Google 
Automates Personalized Search, CNET NEWS, June 28, 2005, http://www.news.com/ 
Google-automates-personalized-search/2100-1032_3-5766899.html (reporting that Google 
launched a new version of its personalized search that monitors previous searches to refine 
future results). 
16. For example, if 100 people search for “alternatives to Microsoft Word software” on a 
search engine on a given day and all pick the third-ranked result, the search algorithm may 
adjust itself and put the third-ranked result as the first result the next day. The most-used 
search engine will have more data to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals. 
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first result in a given day, the search engine can tailor results for 
that area to elevate what was once merely the third result. If other 
firms were able to observe this process, they might be able to 
develop rival, and better, computational strategies. Instead, the 
data is kept secret.17 The self-reinforcing “Matthew Effect” 
described by Robert Merton takes hold: to those who already have 
much, more is given.18 Incumbents with large numbers of users 
enjoy substantial advantages over entrants. 
Competition may not lead to less secretive search engines 
unless the important search engine—Google—becomes more open 
about its own data and algorithms. It is impossible to find better 
interpretations and applications of data without access to it. As 
long as Google's search data is secret, no would-be rival will have 
access to this critical “raw material” for search innovation. 
Google’s Chief Scientist Peter Norvig has made this very point. 
"We don't have better algorithms than everyone else,” he has 
stated; “we just have more data.”19  Thus Google itself controls the 
chief input into better search services: the data that engineers need 
in order to better personalize results.20      
Restrictive terms of service also deter competitors who aspire 
to reverse engineer and develop better versions of such services.21 
                                                                                                                  
17. Rival teams might try to run billions of Google searches themselves to reverse 
engineer the algorithms, but that would violate the terms of service and would be easily 
detected and deterred. 
18. Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science: The Reward and Communication 
Systems of Science are Considered, Science (1968), available at http://www.garfield. 
library.upenn.edu/merton/matthew1.pdf (inspired by Matthew 25:29: “For unto every one 
that hath shall be given” more). 
19. Matt Asay, Tim O’Reilly: ‘Whole Web’ is the OS of the Future, CNET.COM (Mar. 
18, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10469399-16.html; see also How Google 
Plans to Stay Ahead in Search, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 2, 2009), 
http://buswk.co/1arA6c (noting Google’s Eric Schmidt’s statement that “Scale is the key. 
We just have so much scale in terms of the data we can bring to bear.”). 
20. Similar issues were raised by the Google/ITA deal.  Randy Stutz, An Examination of 
the Antitrust Issues Posed by Google’s Acquisition of ITA, American Antitrust Institute 
White Paper, at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Google-
ITA%20AAI%20White%20Paper2.18.11.pdf (“acquiring ITA would put Google in the 
business of supplying a technology  input that powers downstream products in a vertical 
online search market. That is, Google would own what many consider to be the premier 
technology that online travel agents, travel meta-search websites, and airline websites 
license from ITA to afford Internet users the ability to search real-time  
pricing and seat availability data in the course of shopping for airline tickets online”).  That 
is one reason why the DOJ required Google to “license ITA’s software, to continue to 
upgrade it and to establish firewalls to hide ITA clients' proprietary information from 
Google” for five years.  John Simpson and Carmen Balber, DOJ’s Strict Conditions on 
Google/ITA Deal Will Open Internet Giant To Unprecedented Scrutiny, CONSUMER 
WATCHDOG, at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/doj%E2%80%99s-strict-
conditions-googleita-deal-will-open-internet-giant-unprecedented-scrutiny.  
21. See Google Inc., Terms of Service at § 5.4 (Same policy on Apr. 16, 2007, and July 
25, 2011), http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS. Google’s terms of service prohibit any 
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Every time a user types in a search query, he is treated by Google 
as having agreed to Google’s “Terms of Service.”22 That contract 
forbids users to reproduce, copy, or resell any Google service for 
any reason, even if the behavior is manual and nondisruptive.23 
Another section proscribes “creat[ing] a derivative work of . . . the 
Software.”24 Advertisers have faced other restrictions imposed by 
Google’s AdWords Terms & Conditions.25 All of these factors 
militate against robust competition. 
Quantum leaps in technology capable of overcoming these 
brute disadvantages are unlikely. Search is as much about 
personalized service as it is about technical principles of 
information organization and retrieval.26 Current advantage in 
search is likely to be self-reinforcing, especially given that so 
many more people are using the services now than when Google 
overtook other search engines in the early 2000s.27 
There are isolated consumer boycotts of Google, but a 
company so dominant can do without the business of, say, 
hardcore Rick Santorum supporters. Most of the problems 
described above would not even be noticed by ordinary web 
searchers, let alone provoke a protest. Why would the average user 
compare dozens of search results to assess and re-assess rival 
companies?  Consumers lack both the incentive and the ability to 
detect manipulation as long as they are getting “good enough” 
                                                                                                                  
action that “interferes with or disrupts” Google’s services, networks, or computers. 
Repeated queries to the service necessary to gather data on its operations may well violate 
these terms. 
22. Id.. 
23. Id.at § 5.5.  
24. Id. at § 10.2. Together, these sections of the TOS explicitly forbid much of the data 
harvesting that might be necessary for rival firms to incrementally innovate beyond the 
current capacities of Google’s services. Commercial scraping of data, such as the use of 
software to automatically gather data from the Google service by a competitor to establish a 
rival search engine, is prohibited by multiple sections. Section 5.3 would proscribe both the 
automatic data collection and the use of a unapproved “interface” for accessing Google’s 
database, regardless of the exact means.  
25. See Ben Edelman, Google-Yahoo Ad Deal is Bad for Online Advertising, HARVARD 
BUS. S. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Aug.12, 2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/cgi-
bin/print/5995.html (arguing that “Google’s restrictions on export and copying of 
advertisers’ campaigns . . . hinder competition in Internet advertising”). Though the hearing 
at which Professor Edelman was to testify was cancelled, he has documented these 
problems in some detail at his website, www.benedelman.org. 
26. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES 
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 8 (2006) (describing how personalized 
search enhances the value of search engines to both users and advertisers). Due to trade 
secrecy, it is impossible for policymakers to discover how much of an intermediary’s 
success is due to its employees’ inventive genius, and how much is due to the collective 
contributions of millions of users to the training of the intermediary’s computers.  
27. See RANDALL STROSS, PLANET GOOGLE: ONE COMPANY’S AUDACIOUS PLAN TO 
ORGANIZE EVERYTHING WE KNOW (2007) (describing the success of YouTube, a 
subsidiary of Google).  
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results. Given the opacity of search algorithms, neither users nor 
trusted proxies can reverse engineer the hundreds of factors that go 
into a ranking.28 
Rather than “Competition is one click away” (the mantra of 
Google's antitrust lawyers), a more honest shibboleth would be 
“worse alternatives are one click away” (the view expressed 
privately to the investors who have driven up Google’s stock price 
over the years). Google use is more like co-investment than a one-
off purchase. The more you use it, the more it can tailor its 
offerings to you.  As Marcelo Thompson observes, “it is clear that 
a situation of lock-in has arisen in relation to Google's dominant 
position in the information environment.”29 And just as individuals 
“teach” the artificially intelligent algorithms what each of them 
wants, Google’s access to the aggregate data on search behavior 
helps fill in gaps where past surveillance of individuals provides 
no guides. 
IV. THE ANTITRUST TRAP 
In the U.S., mere possession of dominant market share—or 
even a monopoly—is not enough to lead to antitrust liability. 
Complainants must show evidence of genuine restraint of trade, a 
set of practices rendered more difficult to prove over the decades 
by courts increasingly influenced by the Chicago School of 
economics. Though American antitrust laws (including the 
Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts) were rooted in a political vision 
of fragmenting business power to avoid corporate capture of the 
legislative process, courts gradually tired of trying to bring order to 
precedents based on highly contextualized assessments of 
corporate conduct.30 They chose, instead, to gradually adopt a 
highly technical set of definitions of   anti-competitive conduct. 
                                                                                                                  
28. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the 
Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 185 (2001) (discussing the difficulty 
of replicating a search engine’s work). 
29. Marcelo Thompson, In Search of Alterity: On Google, Neutrality, and Otherness, 14 
TULANE J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 137, 165 (2011) (describing the “click away delusion”).  
30. See Maurice Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951 (2008) 
Noting that:  
 [a]lthough neoclassical economic theory may be indifferent to 
[many] distributional effects, one concern underlying the Sherman 
Act’s passage in 1890 was the growing disparity in wealth . . . . 
Senator Sherman identified this inequality of condition, of wealth, 
and opportunity as the greatest threat to disturbing social order: This 
inequality has grown within a single generation out of the 
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production 
and trade and to break down competition. 
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Behind the technique, though, lay a seminal work by Robert Bork, 
The Antitrust Paradox.31 
Bork’s thesis was relatively simple. Antitrust lawyers tended 
to defend their interventions in markets by saying that monopolies 
(and large firms exercising market power) were inefficient. Only 
competition would lead firms to innovate, reduce prices and 
improve quality. But for Bork, this forward-looking explanation 
for progressive antitrust policy missed the backward-looking 
evidence of exceptional innovation—that is, market dominance. 
We should expect the truly exceptional firm to attract a mass of 
consumers. Market dominance could just as easily be evidence of a 
firms’ productivity as its power. Thus Bork called antitrust law a 
“policy at war with itself:” in the name of promoting competition, 
the law could take off the table the greatest reward for competing 
well—market dominance. 
As Bork’s (and the Chicago School’s) ideas took hold, U.S. 
antitrust law became encrusted with an apparatus methods 
designed to spot those instances when a firm has won its dominant 
position in a market by clearly illegitimate means. Monopolies are 
fine, so long as they are not the result (or cause) of 
“monopolization.” An ever-narrowing set of actions and effects, 
not a firm’s dominant status, are the key triggers for monitoring 
and potential penalties. 
 A post hoc, episodic antitrust enforcement model could 
work in a relatively simple business world, where written business 
records could be subject to definitive econometric analyses. But 
what happens in digital businesses driven by complex algorithms, 
where intent and effect can be hidden in millions of lines of 
computer code subject to multiple interpretations and almost 
entirely hidden from view. Even in environments conducive to 
investigation, one person’s  anti-competitive conduct can often be 
                                                                                                                  
31. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). Bork argued antitrust law 
should narrowly focus on “consumer welfare,” price-fixing, and little else. Bork’s book has 
been cited in over 150 antitrust cases. Bork’s followers largely ignore the ways powerful 
firms can leverage long-term dominance by using profits gained from one monopoly to 
undercut competitors in adjacent fields. They have steadily undermined a more expansive 
vision of how antitrust can benefit society by ensuring competition and enabling small, 
emerging companies to thrive, compete, and innovate. If a business practice appears to help 
individual consumers, however trivially, there’s little concern about its long term effects; 
see also Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does The Chicago School Teach About 
Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment Of Google?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE, http://aei.org/files/2012/10/05/-what-does-the-chicago-school-teach-about-
internet-search-and-the-antitrust-treatment-of-google_132249480630.pdf (blessing Google’s 
near-monopoly over search advertising as “pro-competitive” in one of Bork’s last writings, 
an October 2012 white paper commissioned by Google). But see Scott Cleland, Bork-
Sidak’s Fatally Flawed Google Antitrust Defense, THE PRECURSOR BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.precursorblog.com/node/1737. 
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characterized as another’s effective business strategy—thus the 
enormous time and expense devoted to many modern antitrust 
suits. Antitrust cases tend to consume a great deal of resources, in 
part because economic conduct is subject to many different 
interpretations.32 When “new economy” firms enter the mix, 
regulators are liable to throw up their hands in frustration, 
unwilling to even try to give a reliable, public estimate of the 
harms and benefits arising out of any particular transaction or 
practice.  
V. KICKING THE TIRES IS NOT LOOKING UNDER THE HOOD 
This appears to have happened during the FTC’s investigation 
into anti-competitive search bias at Google. Despite having an over 
100-page memo prepared by staff describing the bases of a case 
against Google in 2012, the Commission stalled action repeatedly 
and barely stirred itself to hire the requisite technical experts to 
understand the bases of complaints against the company that 
year.33 It finally closed the investigation, in a document that spent 
barely 2 pages discussing search bias allegations.34 
The FTC did “not find Google’s business practices with 
respect to the claimed search bias to be, on balance, demonstrably  
anti-competitive.” But the decision was almost immediately 
second guessed, because the agency failed to articulate exactly 
why it believed search bias would be illegal under current antitrust 
law, how one would test for it, and whether those who believed 
they were affected by it would be able to challenge the agency’s 
                                                                                                                  
32. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent the Problem 
that It Can’t Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (1999). 
The main concern in finding a remedy for [‘bad monopolist 
behaviors’] may be time: The technology environment moves at a 
lightning pace, and by the time a federal case has been made out of a 
problem, the problem is proven, a remedy fashioned, and appeals 
exhausted, the damage may already be irreversible. 
33. See Steve Lohr, Drafting Antitrust Case, F.T.C. Raises Pressure on Google, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/technology/ftc-staff-prepares-
antitrust-case-against-google-over-search.html (reporting that the FTC staff had prepared a 
secret 100-page memo advocating legal action against Google). The sudden reversal in 
January, 2013, raised many questions. Did the staff change its mind completely in less than 
90 days? Were they been overruled by political appointees? See Peter Maass, Your FTC 
Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, WIRED (June 28 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/ftc-fail/all/ (noting, in the privacy context, that 
“[t]he agency can take companies to court, but its overworked lawyers don’t really have the 
time to go the distance against the bottomless legal staffs in Silicon Valley.” Is the same 
now true for competition law as well? 
34. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In 
the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163, January 3, 2013, 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf. 
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interpretations of its analyses of data provided by Google.35 In 
response to allegations of search bias, Google’s public assurances 
have amounted to little more than a message of,  “Trust us.” And at 
the end of its investigation into the potential bias, the FTC 
essentially said  “We do.”36 
Journalists and watchdog groups were disappointed in the 
conclusion of the FTC’s investigation as well.. As a New York 
Times reporter put it, “the FTC did not detail how it defined harm 
or what quantitative measures it had used to determine that Google 
users were better off.”37 Nor did the agency appear to consider 
whether small consumer gains now from, say, an ultra-clean 
interface of purely Google-owned or -affiliated results might later 
disserve consumers who want more diverse offerings. In response 
to this opacity, one public interest group has already put in a FOIA 
request for communications between Google and the FTC. 
Consumer Watchdog has requested public disclosure of a staff 
report that was reported to have recommended more robust 
action.38 
The Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC 
responded to these concerns, assuring the New York Times that, 
“We kick the tires hard on all of the data we receive.” But the 4 
page findings of the Commission don’t even give us a sense of the 
hypotheses the FTC tested, or even the full legal theory of the case. 
If one of my students came to me at the end of a seminar with a 
four page report elaborating on the idea that “there really wasn’t 
much of a problem” in the area he had investigated, he would get a 
failing grade. Certainly a federal agency with staff, concluding a 
20-month investigation, can do better than this. 
The Director’s comment is unintentionally revealing, however. 
In my past work on consumer protection and competition 
regulation, I have insisted that agencies be able to “look under the 
hood” of highly advanced technologies like the algorithms at the 
heart of the Google search engine.39 This might involve hiring 
                                                                                                                  
35. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In 
the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
36. Frank Pasquale, Google Antitrust: The FTC Folds, MADISONIAN (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://madisonian.net/2013/01/03/google-antitrust-the-ftc-folds/ 
37. See Edward Wyatt, Critics of Google Antitrust Ruling Fault the Focus, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/technology/googles-rivals-say-ftc-
antitrust-ruling-missed-the-point.html 
38. See Stephen Shankland, Watchdog Seeks FTC Staff Opinion on Google Antitrust 
Case, CNET.COM (Jan. 8, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57562841-
93/watchdog-seeks-ftc-staff-opinion-on-google-antitrust-case/ 
39. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105. 
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computer scientists, programmers, and other experts capable of 
understanding exactly how algorithms changed over time, and how 
directives from top management might influence what is always 
portrayed as a scientific, technical, and neutral process.40 “Kicking 
the tires” is not a metaphor suggestive of expert analysis. Rather, it 
suggests a skeptical consumer trying, as best he can, to use 
whatever signals are available to a layman to make an assessment 
ultimately beyond his competence. Until the FTC releases more 
information on how it assesses accusations like search bias, we 
may need to consider its investigative capacity little better than 
that of the consumers it ostensibly protects. 
Fortunately, there are some signs of hope at the agency, at 
least among privacy regulators.  Realizing how quickly the world 
of online data collection is moving, the FTC has taken important 
steps to monitor evolving business practices.  The agency 
appointed “Chief Technologists” and has also employed highly 
regarded privacy experts with expertise in computer science.  Each 
has done a great deal to help the agency apply expertise to current 
problems in privacy.  Moreover, the agency’s report, Protecting 
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations 
For Businesses and Policymakers, was a model of sensitive 
appreciation of stakeholder concerns, leading to guidance on some 
best practices for digital companies.   
 This perceptive, well-written report grappled with 
fundamental issues in the law of fair data practices and consumer 
protection. Where the law was plainly inadequate, the report said 
so. For example, it supported "legislation that would provide 
consumers with access to information held by data brokers," an 
increasingly important priority in a pervasively scored society.41  
The FTC’s December 2012 subpoena of leading data brokers 
indicates an interest in illuminating some of the darker corners of 
data collection, analysis, sharing, and use.  The FTC’s commitment 
to technical personnel and cutting edge reports is something of a 
model for other agencies tasked with protecting privacy in an era 
of rapid change.  We can hope that the Bureau of Competition will 
learn from the example of its colleagues in privacy regulation. 
                                                                                                                  
40. Elizabeth Van Couvering, Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science, and War: 
Discourses of Search Engine Quality, JCMC , Vol. 12, No. 3 (2007) at 866–87. 
41. Applying the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the FTC itself required firms that “score” the 
health status of individuals based on their pharmacy records to disclose these records to 
scored individuals.  
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VI. THE HOPE AT THE BOTTOM OF PANDORA’S BOX 
To be sure, Google hired some of the best minds in the legal 
profession (and academy) to promote its position.42 That kind of 
advocacy often gets results. But until we have a better sense of the 
answers to the questions above, the bottom line is that a black box 
investigation exonerated a black box search engine—cold comfort 
for those who might worry about the power exercised by Google 
online. 
Fortunately, in the terms of Google’s own “commitment letter” 
to the FTC, Google states that it won’t demote sites in general 
purpose search results (on Google.com) if the sites opt out of 
having their content scraped onto Google Shopping, G+ Local, 
Flights, Hotels, and Advisor pages. As the FTC Chairman put it, 
“Going forward, Google will allow websites the ability to opt out 
of appearing in its vertical properties like Google Local or Product 
Shopping, without being penalized or demoted in its general search 
results on Google.com.”43 But what happens if a site produces 
evidence that it has been demoted after opt-out (during the 5-year 
period this commitment letter is good for)? Is there any FTC 
process that will be faster, more accurate, or more streamlined 
than, say, a good old-fashioned adjudication?  
If the FTC’s Google search bias investigation is not to have 
been a total waste, we will need to see positive answers to these 
questions. To assure a better competitive landscape online, 
promote privacy, and get a handle on the quasi-governmental role 
of large internet companies, we need a much better sense of how 
these companies are actually conducting their business and using 
data. 
 To conclusively adjudicate cases like these, a panel 
advising the FTC would need extensive access to the relevant 
Google search algorithms to assess the company's treatment of 
                                                                                                                  
42. See Eric Goldman, The FTC Smartly Ends Its Imprudent Google Search Antitrust 
Investigation, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman 
/2013/01/03/the-ftc-smartly-ends-its-imprudent-google-search-antitrust-investigation/.  
Google spent millions of dollars trying to sway the FTC. Google’s 
economic stimulus package included a dozen DC lobbying firms . . . 
big brand-name paid influencers such as Robert Bork (recently 
deceased), Eugene Volokh, Marvin Ammori and many others, and 
multiple conferences designed to educate DC insiders. Not directly 
tied to this investigation, Google also has invested substantially in its 
policy and advocacy work in other ways, as we discovered in Oracle 
v. Google and we’ve seen from its work in Germany. 
43. Google Press Conference, Opening Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman 
Jon Leibowitz As Prepared for Delivery (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ 
leibowitz/130103googleleibowitzremarks.pdf. 
 Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust 15 
 
upstart vertical search services.44 Google keeps close tabs on its 
users’ every click; surely it is not too much to ask the company 
itself to document all the changes to its algorithms (and especially 
manual interventions by human beings) so that someone—such as 
a regulatory agency, a nonprofit organization, a judge, or a 
standard-setting body—can look under the hood and understand 
what is going on. After the Microsoft antitrust case, the parties to 
the litigation agreed to appoint a Technical Committee to be 
empowered to understand how decisions at that critical computing 
company originated and how they were implemented. A similar 
body should be appointed for Google, and quite possibly for 
Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Twitter as well. 
  Reporting to a Technical Committee may seem like a 
major burden for a technology company.45 However, changes in 
ranking methodology at such firms are rigorously tested and 
documented.46 When a website suddenly tumbles dozens of places 
in search results, and has a plausible story about being targeted as a 
potential rival of an established Google interest or in a space the 
company is planning to invest in, is it too much to ask for some 
third party to review the particular factors that led to the demotion? 
Given how quickly a sudden drop usually occurs, we are not 
discussing an infinite variety of changes to be reviewed. Nor 
would such review require the disclosure of the entire algorithm to 
a third-party auditor, or even the revelation of the relevant changes 
in the algorithm to the party involved, much less the general 
public.47 In my early work on this topic, my coauthor and I even 
                                                                                                                  
44. The question is whether the change was driven entirely by its purported account of a 
multistep, user-test-driven process of assessing the quality of search results, or whether 
motives of self-preservation and competition strangulation informed the ostensibly neutral 
ranking algorithms. 
45. Managers of the Ammori Group, a law firm and Internet-law consulting practice 
whose client include Google, have made this argument.  Marvin Ammori and Luke Pelican, 
Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias, 15(11) J. INTERNET L. 1, 16, 26  (2012) 
(“Microsoft's top lawyer for antitrust issues noted that the technical committee's staff 
ballooned from three people to 40 and that the majority of Microsoft's compliance efforts 
required laborious and time-consuming back-and-forth with that committee.”); Erick 
Schonfeld, “Google and Monopoly Theater,” TechCrunch, Sept. 25, 2011 (“Senator Al 
Franken suggested the possibility of a voluntary technical committee to provide oversight, 
to which Google's outside lawyer Susan Creighton responded (quite correctly): ‘Google 
already changes its algorithm 500 times a year. I think a technical committee would be too 
slow to keep up with changes in the market.’”).   
46. See e.g., Search Quality Highlights: 52 Changes for April, INSIDE SEARCH: THE 
OFFICIAL GOOGLE SEARCH BLOG (May 4, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://insidesearch. 
blogspot.com/2012/05/search-quality-highlights-53-changes.html (last updated May 6, 
2012). 
47. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 
115, 125 (2006) (discussing the need to balance the trade secrecy interests of search engines 
against regulators’ prerogatives to understand the basis of some ranking decisions). 
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pointed to the precedent of the secretive Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) court as a model, to underscore how much 
we respected the intellectual property rights of the company whose 
actions are being reviewed (and particularly the value of trade 
secrecy).48 
As antitrust expert Mark Patterson has shown, the Dodd-Frank 
Act already requires far more disclosure from rating agencies than 
was previously required.49 Patterson believes that such legislation 
is a model for intervention here, because “Google has been alleged 
to have manipulated its search results (or ratings) in much the same 
way that the rating agencies have been alleged to have manipulated 
credit ratings.”50 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Patterson documents, 
“Congress directed the SEC to prescribe rules that, when credit-
rating agencies make ‘material changes’ to ‘rating procedures and 
methodologies,’ ensure that: ‘the changes are applied consistently 
to all credit ratings to which the changed procedures and 
methodologies apply . . . and [the CRA] publicly discloses the 
reason for the change.’”51 Such requirements do not impinge on 
                                                                                                                  
48. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, 
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008). 
49. Mark Patterson, Manipulation of Product Ratings: Credit-Rating Agencies, Google, 
and Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Apr. 17, 2012, https://www. 
competitionpolicyinternational.com/manipulation-of-product-ratings-credit-rating-agencies-
google-and-antitrust/, noting that: 
Although Google is alleged to have manipulated the ratings of 
competitors (e.g., potentially competing “vertical” search engines) 
and credit rating agencies are alleged to have manipulated the ratings 
of customers (issuers of financial products), the basic phenomenon is 
the same . . . . lack of transparency in quality can give an information 
provider market power, as does an absence of price transparency. 
50. Id. Evgeny Morozov and Julie Cohen have also advocated for more independent 
review of tech companies’ algorithms.  MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: 
THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (finding international examples to 
buttress Patterson’s and Carroll’s comparison between financial and tech regulation, based 
on Hong Kong’s regulation of algorithmic trading); COHEN, CONFIGURING THE 
NETWORKED SELF 8 (2011) (“The lives of situated subjects are increasingly shaped by 
decisions made and implemented using networked information technologies. Those 
decisions present some possibilities and foreclose others. Most people have very little 
understanding of the ways that such decisions are made or of the options that are not 
presented. In many cases, this facial inaccessibility is reinforced by regimes of secrecy that 
limit even technically trained outsiders to “black box” testing. We would not tolerate 
comparable restrictions on access to the basic laws of physics, chemistry, or biology, which 
govern the operation of the physical environment. The algorithms and protocols that sort 
and categorize situated subjects, shape information flows, and authorize or deny access to 
network resources are the basic operational laws of the emerging networked information 
society; to exercise meaningful control over their surroundings, people need access to a 
baseline level of information about what those algorithms and protocols do.”). 
51. Id. 
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the information providers’ judgments; they simply require that 
some information about it be given.52  
In contexts ranging from privacy rights to false advertising, 
authorities in the US and Europe have recognized the need for fast, 
flexible “quick looks” at suspect business practices.53 In the case of 
FTC investigations into false advertising, 95% of problematic 
situations are quickly resolved in a self-regulatory fashion, by 
nongovernmental entities. This is not a recipe for the litigation 
nightmares industry advocates so frequently invoke. Rather, it is a 
matter of establishing some entity outside of Google (and other 
very large internet companies), whether as a result of competition 
law, consumer protection law, or other principles of commercial 
fairness, that has authority to review and offer its judgment on 
such questions.  
What that entity ultimately does about its findings is not my 
central concern at this time. Simply informing consumers about 
potential biases would be a valuable public service. Indeed, Google 
itself often deflects complaints about its services by arguing that 
consumer education is the solution. If Google is serious about 
valuing openness, it should welcome such scrutiny. 
VII. REGULATION’S RATIONALE: THE GROWING PREVALENCE 
OF CREDENCE SERVICES AND MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS IN A 
COMPLEX ECONOMY 
There are two critical rationales for holding search engines to 
higher standards than ordinary internet companies. First, they 
operate not only as simple sellers of services, but as multisided 
platforms, bringing together advertisers, consumers, and all 
manner of other cultural and political entities. That status, as 
intermediaries that users must use and trust for reliability, flags the 
history of regulation of communications networks as a potential 
model for search regulation.  
Second, search is, in many circumstances, a “credence 
service.” To understand its uniqueness, compare it with other 
                                                                                                                  
52. Andrew Carroll, Don’t Be Evil. . . Unless it Increases Revenue: What the Operation 
of Credit Rating Agencies Can Teach Us About Google, 31 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH., & ENV. L 
93, 117 (“The similarities between the problems existing within both CRAs and 
Google make Dodd-Frank a good starting point for regulating Google. Requiring an internal 
documentation process as well as yearly reviews by a regulatory agency could also be 
applied to Google's ranking process. By implementing such oversight, the government 
would be able to ensure that the objectivity proclaimed by Google is actually being 
instituted without the risk of outside manipulation that is created by public disclosure.”).   
53. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. Rev. 105 (2010). 
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services.  Consumers can immediately assess the value of ordinary 
goods and services: a car is either cleaned or it is not; a drinking 
glass either holds liquids or fails to. Government agencies also 
help to keep other quality concerns out of mind. Most of the time, 
we don’t need to independently test our food for E. coli, or re-
weigh a box of cereal to assure it really contains 10 ounces of bran 
flakes. We can assume the Food and Drug Administration, and a 
state board of weights of and measures, have sufficiently vetted 
quality. Experience goods and services are a bit more of a 
challenge to find and evaluate: only after consumption can you 
really say whether, say, a given song is worth purchasing, or a 
restaurant has lived up to its reputation.54  
Credence goods and services are more perplexing: it is often 
difficult to assess their quality accurately even after they have been 
purchased and used. When a non-lawyer seeks legal advice about a 
complex situation, it’s very hard for him or her to know if he has 
been well served. Similarly, a patient may need to seek a second 
opinion about a doctor’s diagnosis. In these scenarios, the 
consumer himself may not even be able to assess the quality of the 
service after experiencing it; only time (or an expert) will reveal 
the level of quality. Thus the “credence” nomenclature: the 
ordinary consumer must trust the provider more than an ordinary 
vendor, because it’s expensive (and sometimes impossible) to 
know if the provider has actually given her best efforts (let alone 
provided appropriate advice or care).55 
Search is also often a credence service: you would probably 
not be using a search engine if you already knew what you wanted. 
And rare is the person who takes the time to compare results at one 
search engine with those at another. Moreover, given the 
importance of personalization to many good search results, it’s 
hard to imagine how this could even be done: the service provided 
by the search engine with more data about your prior searching 
habits may be entirely different than one working from a blank 
slate.   
 Is it too much to ask for some entity outside of Google to be 
able to “look under the hood” and understand what is going on in 
                                                                                                                  
54. See Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78(2) Journal of Political 
Economy 311–29 (1970), available at http://193.146.160.29/gtb/sod/usu/ 
$UBUG/repositorio/10290324_Nelson.pdf.  
55. Both the legal and medical professions are heavily regulated in part in order to protect 
consumers against information asymmetries they can’t easily redress. Both doctors and 
lawyers must pass exams to demonstrate that they actually know what they are doing, 
engage in continuing education to keep their skills sharp, and often buy malpractice 
insurance in order to be sure that victims of their mistakes enjoy some kind of 
compensation. Conflicts of interests must be minimized and disclosed when they arise. 
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plausibly contested scenarios? If so, such an abdication of 
administrative responsibility in the face of technical complexity 
bodes ill not merely for a level competitive playing field, but for 
democratic and judicial processes themselves in an era of 
technological advance.56 The FTC flirts with irrelevance if it 
disdains the technical tools necessary to understand a modern 
information economy. 
VIII. AGAINST DIGITAL FEUDALISM 
Is there any natural limit to the aspirations of a large internet 
company like Google? As Siva Vaidhyanathan noted in his 
thoughtful 2010 book The Googlization of Everything, Google’s 
stated goal is to “organize the world’s information.” As more 
economic value is concentrated in virtual products and automation, 
this aspiration becomes all the more striking. Organizing global 
information flows and archives is a few short steps from 
organizing global economic activity itself. That aspiration is the 
natural extension of Wall Street demands for constant corporate 
growth. Tech giants are already huge—in mid-2012, Apple alone 
contributed to 20% of the gains of the S&P 500, and Facebook’s 
initial market valuation was based on assumptions that it would 
gain 10% of all global advertising budgets by 2020. Eyeing these 
figures, Google’s own push for constant growth is a bit more 
understandable. 
If antitrust law continues to decline in power and scope, we 
should expect a digital replay of the domination of monopolistic 
trusts in the late nineteenth century. As central to our era’s 
economy as railroads were to that time, these companies are likely 
to exploit their infrastructural status for as long as they can 
convince regulators and politicians that their market domination is 
the natural price of innovation. 
For anyone wowed by a free service like Gmail, Google’s 
expansionary moves might seem a welcome intervention. Many 
fields need a dose of data-driven results and user-friendly design. 
Nevertheless, regulators should be concerned about Google using 
its dominance in general purpose search to leverage undue power 
in other, more specialized fields. We either commit to a 21st 
century antitrust law capable of detecting and deterring misuses of 
                                                                                                                  
56. Several authors have commented on the fading relevance of law (and, by implication, 
democracy) when technological imperatives are assumed to trump public values. See, e.g., 
DANILO ZOLO, DEMOCRACY AND COMPLEXITY: A REALIST APPROACH (1992); WILLIAM E. 
SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004). 
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power online, or we allow centralizing tendencies to concentrate 
innovation in the few mega-firms capable of gathering critical data 
and promoting new services on an ever-less-level playing field. 
